Media Report or Treat Violent Crime Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Media Report or Treat Violent Crime - Essay Example The way the media portrays a crime is the way the world will perceive it, the more they exaggerate to increase viewer ratings the more the world lives in fear. Statistics have shown that the crime rate has decreased during the past few years. There was double digit crime inflation during the 1970's. People have that feeling that the crime rate has increased due to the way the media has been portraying each n' every incident! They dramatize the event just to increase their number of viewers. An FBI new release said that the crime rate has increased by only 2.5 per cent nationally. The crime rate has dropped 40-50 per cent since the time it was at its peak. It is funny how none of the media have shown these figures with the same boldness as they do other headlines. As per "Official crime statistics", most of the crime is non-violent, but media reports in many instances have suggested it to be the opposite. It is not only the media's fault. We as viewers are so interested in such news that they can't help it. If they want to make money they will show what the people want to see. There are many other bad things that affect our society, like poverty and inflation. Poverty stories are boring and are not attention-grabbing like blasts, murder, rape and many other such stories.

E-government Model Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

E-government Model - Essay Example These studies indicate a definite trend whereby the researchers have utilized various means of analyzing and assessing user behavior to arrive at a logical conclusion regarding the factors influencing them to adopt e-government services offered by the government. For instance, Reddick (2005) has utilized a systematic approach to study the citizen behavior by observing their interaction with the government. Such observation acts an effective tool in analyzing citizen behavior and attitude and affords the researchers in estimating and understanding the concerns and grievances of the citizens and overcome them to achieve desired results. The successful adoption and implementation of any e-government model depends on the attitudes of the users, which in turn is influenced by a combination of factors such as perceived usefulness of the e-government model as well as socio-cultural influences (Chen and Thurmaier, 2005; Kumar et al., 2007; Al-Shehry et al., 2006). According to Venkatesh et a l., (2003) the term social influence refers to "the degree to which peers influence the use of the system". It could be either positive or negative and is the key factor that motivates / de-motivates individuals to adapt to a given situation. Various studies have indicated that the collective culture of a country provides an informative insight into the manner in which people behave and their likely reaction towards a new situation (Carter and Weerakkody, 2008; Dimitrova and Chen, 2006).

Mind body issue Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Mind body issue - Essay Example One of the most important questions asked is whether the mind is part of the body or the body part of the mind. What makes the two connect or interact with each other if at all they are distinct? This also makes many wonder, which one should be in charge in case of distinctive existence. The question requires proper understanding and argumentation because every point of view has a logical explanation. The main aim is to ensure that the process of determining this will meet the main attributes of the relationship, explaining everything based on the theories put forward to explain this relationship. The mind and the body are two distinct attributes that casually interact at given times for the sake of performing bodily activities. Descartes is one of the proponents of dualism and pointed out clearly that the mind was the consciousness that existed within an individual. Unlike the brain, which was the source of the intelligence individuals possessed, the mind was an attribute that defined and determined the thought processes of a human being (Squire 20). The main reason for taking a dualistic stand is the fact that the mind has a different functionality in comparison to matter. Mind has a conscious attribute that cannot not reduced to physical attributes despite the number of times studies are conducted on it. A proper organization of matter allows for emergence of mental properties (Kim 40). The mind will only react to that which it sees as appropriately connected to the way it operates. This means that the mind will not come to full action when it perceives something is not okay. When someone is sick, the body has some deficiencies. The body will not operate well and the mind will be unresponsive in that are a. For example, if one has leprosy, the body goes numb and no thought process can make that part of the body to have any form of functionality. The mind will work on

Educational interests and goals, educational background, special Essay

Educational interests and goals, educational background, special interests, and plans for when you return to your home country - Essay Example In 2006, I was given the Most Outstanding Boarder award from Hills International, as well as a Certificate of Achievement for academic results for demonstrating diligence in studies. I feel proud to state that, in 2007, I was among the top 10 percent of the Hills International graduating class. I received commendations for academic excellence in English and Mathematics, and in Physical Education. I also received the prestigious Caltex All Rounder Award for achievement at school and in the broader community. I was College Captain of Hills International College in 2007, and was also a student of the Hills International Golf Academy in 2006-2007. Sport has been an important part in my life-golf is a passion with me. Interest in the game developed because of my family-especially my dad-who, having served three terms as club captain of the Sabah Golf and Country Club, also takes keen interest in junior golf development in Malaysia. I started golf at the age of 12 under my father's coaching, and later trained under British and Australian PGA's. I have received many awards in the sport (a detailed list is enclosed), among which are the First Place for Girls Under 12 Sport Excel Junior Circuit qualifier (Sabah-2002) and the Best Overall Position for All Sabah Players-2003(international Event). In Australia, I represented the Methodist Ladies' College in the golf tournament for Western Australian schools, and also the Royal Fremantle Golf Club in all junior tournaments. My current scores are: average scores 9 rounds, 693 strokes, average 77; Personal Best Tournament Score 72 (par). I derive inspiration for my game from Jason Day, who studied at Hills, and is a golf buddy. Jason was the World Junior Champion in 2004. I spend an average of four hours a day practicing golf. I also play badminton, basketball and touch football for fun. I represented my school in Badminton, cross-country and middle distance running. I am also a PADI open water diver and have logged over 50 dives. I frequently dive at Sipadan Island, which has some of the best diving spots in the world. I read a lot during my free time, especially after my golf practice, which helps me to unwind. I have participated in arts and musical events too while in school. I passed the examination in Pianoforte with high honors, and obtained the third position in the 21st Inter-Secondary Schools Choral competition. I now play the piano for relaxation. I also received an 'Outstanding Achievement' mention in the poster competition for the theme Sports against Drugs under the Rotary Youth Leadership Development Program (2002). I have had some work experience, having worked as 'Assistant Banker' at the Commonwealth Bank, Claremont (W Aus.) in 2005. I have also done voluntary work with the deaf and dumb center at Bukti Padang, Malaysia. Here I participated in activities with hearing impaired children, and was a 'buddy' to a child at the center. I learned sign language for this purpose. I enjoyed my time and learned a lot during the past 3 years in Australia. I had the chance here to meet many friends and people from different parts of the world. It is this experience away from home as a student-athlete, which taught me the importance of being independent, as well

Native American educational traditions passed Essay Example for Free

Native American educational traditions passed Essay Before contact with Europeans, Native Americans developed an effective system of informal education call aboriginal education. The system included transmitting knowledge, values, skills, attitudes, and dispositions to the next generation in real world settings such as the farm, at home, or on the hunting ground. Education was viewed as a way to beautify and sharpen the next generation and prepare them to take over the mantle of leadership. The purpose of education was for an immediate induction of the next generation into society and preparation for adulthood. Education was for introducing society with all its institutions, taboos, mores, and functions to the individual. Also, education was intended for making the individual a part of the totality of the social consciousness. Native American education delineated social responsibility, skill orientation, political participation, and spiritual and moral values. The cardinal goals of Native American education were to develop the individual’s latent physical skills and character, inculcate respect for elders and those in authority in the individual, and help the individual acquire specific vocational training (Franklin, 1979). Native American education was also for developing a healthy attitude toward honest labor, developing a sense of belonging and encouraging active participation in community activities. Both boys and girls had equal access to education. Boys were taught by their fathers, uncles, grandfathers, and other male elders. Girls were instructed by their mothers, aunts, grandmothers, female elders and other members of their families. Sometimes, both boys and girls received instruction at the feet of either male or female elders (Mould, 2004). There were barely any dropouts and the community ensured that every child received a full education. Youth appropriate information and knowledge was not hidden from any child. Several teaching strategies, including storytelling, were utilized to pass on knowledge and culture to the youth. In fact, Mould (2004) believed that storytelling was a sacred and vital part of a Native American youth’s education. Knowledge and culture were passed down orally, â€Å"crafted into stories that would instruct, inspire, provoke, question, challenge, and entertain† (Mould, 2004). Often, the youth would gather together to listen to the elders as they related the knowledge once entrusted to them when they were children (Mould, 2004). The philosophy of education was that of the development of the individual as well as the whole society (Johnson et al. , 2005). Educational philosophy also emphasized the importance of nature. The pursuit of knowledge and happiness were subordinated to a respect for the whole universe. According to Johnson, knowledge was equated with an understanding of one’s place in the natural order of things and educators were encouraged to study and teach the physical and social world by examining the natural relationships that exist among things, animals, and humans. Studying ideas in the abstract or as independent entities was not considered as important as understanding the relationships among ideas and physical reality. The essential components of an educational experience included hands on learning, making connections, holding discussions, taking field trips, and celebrations of the moment (Johnson et al. , 2005). These highly effective teaching methods were utilized by adults to transmit culture to or educate the next generation. The youth learned at their own pace and barely competed against one another. The youth were taught to be supportive and nurturing of one another in the learning process. As a result of the holistic education that all youth were exposed to in the period before their contact with Europeans, there were barely any miseducated Native American children. At the time of European contact with Native Americans (from 1492), an advanced system of informal/aboriginal education had been developed by Native Americans as noted earlier. That system was misunderstood by Europeans who thus made efforts to impose their formal system of education on Native Americans. After contact with Europeans, formal education for Native Americans was initially conducted by missionaries and private individuals until the 1830s. There were increased European government efforts to formally educate Native Americans after the passage of the Indian Removal Act (1830) which forced Native Americans onto reservations (Tozer 2009). The purpose of formal education of Native Americans, as far as Europeans were concerned, was forced acculturation or assimilation to European culture (Tozer 2009). The aim of the European system of education was to â€Å"civilize†, Christianize, and Europeanize the Native Americans in European-controlled schools. To achieve this purpose and aim, many Native American children were forcibly removed from their homes and enrolled in European-controlled schools. By 1887, about 14,300 Native American children were enrolled in 227 schools run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or by religious groups (Tozer 2009). The schools were operated based on an Anglo-conformity assimilationist approach. The Anglo-conformity assimilationist approach included the following: 1) Educating the Native Americans away from their culture due to the philosophy of Europeanization or Christianization or â€Å"civilizing† of the Native American through education; 2) Intensive efforts were made to destroy extant Native American cultures by excluding Native American cultures from the school curriculum; 3) Concerted efforts were made to prevent Native American students from following their own culture; and 4) Native American students were punished for speaking their native languages (Feagin Feagin, 2003). This approach motivated European American educators to force Native American students into boarding schools where it was believed that it would be easier and much more effective to Europeanize, Christianize, and â€Å"civilize† them. Students were forced to dress like Europeans, convert to Christianity, and take European names. Students who refused to conform were severely punished. The effects of the Anglo-conformity assimilationist approach on Native Americans cannot be overemphasized. Many of them lost or became confused about their cultural identity. Some tended to know a lot more about European culture, history, philosophy, and languages than about their own culture, history, philosophy, and languages. Europeanization, Christianization and â€Å"civilizing† of Native Americans through formal education seriously undermined the very foundation of Native American cultures and alienated many Native Americans from their own cultures and environment. Formal education forced many Native Americans to absorb European lifestyles and led to individualism as well as serious weakening of traditional authority structure and kin group solidarity. Many Native Americans lost faith in their own cultures and civilizations and absorbed those of Europeans. Some have neither fully adopted European culture nor fully embraced Native American culture and consequently swing between the two in a state of cultural confusion. Eurocentric education has been a miseducation of Native Americans as has been for all minority groups in the United States. These and many other political, social and economic effects of formal education on Native Americans have permeated Native American cultures till today. European American teachers and administrators have blamed Native American educational problems on cultural differences. This is known as cultural deficit theory. According to cultural deficit theorists, disjuncture’s or differences or deficits between the culture of the home and the culture of the school are the reasons for the poor academic achievement of non-European students (Johnson et al. , 2005). European American schools focus only on the dominant culture and expect all students to operate as if they are members of the dominant culture, giving an advantage to students from the dominant group and a disadvantage to those from minority groups (Johnson et al., 2005). What cultural deficit theorists advocate is that students from minority groups, including Native American students, must reject their own cultural patterns and absorb European American cultural patterns in order to be successful in school. Thus, in an effort to assist their students to be high achievers in school, many European American teachers have attempted to make their students â€Å"less Native American† by educating them away from their own cultures and imposing Anglo-European culture on them. Many schools and textbooks exclude Native American experiences and their immeasurable contributions to this society and the rest of the world and provide little to nothing to assist Native American children identify with their own cultures. From the 1930s some boarding schools were replaced by day schools closer to reservations and a bilingual policy of educating Native American students in both Native American languages and the English language was discussed (Feagin Feagin, 2003). Since the 1960s, organized protest has led to increased government involvement and aid for primary, adult, and vocational education for Native Americans on and off the reservations. Federal and local governments have focused more attention on local public schools (outside the reservations) and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) schools in the reservations. For greater inclusion of Native Americans in their own education, Native American advisory boards have been organized in mainstream public schools. More Native Americans have been added to school faculty and staff. Native American art, dances, and languages have been included in the school curriculum. The central curriculum taught in both BIA and mainstream schools have remained the same from colonial times until recently. The curriculum indoctrinates Native American children with the same European American values as in the past (Feagin Feagin, 2003). In many reservations today however, there are efforts to reverse this by teaching students in Native American languages and culture from the early years of their education. In the Choctaw Reservation in Choctaw, Mississippi for example, students are taught in the Chahta and English languages in the first three years of formal schooling and in the English language from the fourth grade onwards. Throughout their schooling to the high school level, they are taught and exposed to Choctaw culture and encouraged to speak the Chahta language in and outside of school. One of the essences of the Annual Choctaw Indian Fair is to educate both the youth and adults in Choctaw cultural practices and traditions and to transmit Choctaw culture to the next generation. The author of this article, who happens to be an African and from a continent which has had similar experiences as those of Native Americans, greatly applauds the new forms of formal education among Native Americans on the reservations, which include an integration of the Native American system before their contact with Europeans and aspects of the European system as a way of preserving what is left of Native American cultures, preparing contemporary Native American youth for their real world settings, and meeting the needs of Native Americans. The large scale migration of many Native Americans to the cities since the 1950s has led to a decline in the number of children in BIA schools. By the early 1990s less than ten percent (10%) of Native American children attended BIA schools (Feagin Feagin, 2003). Today, most Native American children attend mainstream local public schools due to the fact that majority of Native Americans live off reservations with their children (United States Census Bureau, 2001). The mainstream educational system has however failed to meet the needs of Native American students. The failure stems from the absence of a Native American perspective in the curricula, the loss of Native American languages, the shift away from Native American spiritual values, and the racist and discriminatory activities of many European American teachers and administrators (Feagin Feagin, 2003; Schaefer, 2004). Perhaps, mainstream educators could borrow the new forms of formal education being practiced on the reservations which seem to much better meet the needs of Native American students rather than continually imposing the Eurocentric system which has not worked for Native Americans. With regard to higher education, since the 1960s, many mainstream colleges have established Native American Studies centers to provide facilities for the study of Native American issues (Feagin Feagin, 2003). By the late 1990s, more than 134,000 Native Americans were enrolled in colleges and universities throughout the United States (Schaeffer, 2004). Majority of the students attended predominantly European American public colleges and universities. Some of the students were not very successful due to the ingrained racist and discriminatory practices in those institutions. Consequently, many Native American students dropped out of those institutions. In general, Native American formal educational attainment has remained lower than that of the general population due to the Eurocentricity of the educational system. By 1990, less than two-thirds of Native Americans over the age of twenty-five were high school graduates compared to three-fourths of all Americans in that age range. Native American students in mainstream schools are disproportionately placed in special education classrooms. The proportion of Native American students who drop out after tenth-grade is 36%, the highest of any racial or ethnic group and more than twice that of European Americans (Schaeffer, 2004). In view of the aforementioned issues in education among Native Americans, a Department of Education Task Force organized in the late 1990s recommended the following for addressing Native American educational issues: implementation of multicultural curricula that inculcate respect for Native American history and culture, and establishment of programs that guarantee that Native American students learn English well. The task force assumed that if Native American students learn English very well then they will be successful in school, an assumption which is traced to the cultural deficit theory discussed above. Today, many Native American students attend Native American-controlled community colleges. The community colleges integrate Native American history and culture into courses. More attention is given to students and their cultures in the Native American-controlled educational institutions. Native Americans had established an effective educational system which ensured the smooth transmission of their cultures to the next generation before their contact with Europeans. The system included passing on of knowledge, values, attitudes, skills, and dispositions required for successful functioning of every individual in real world settings. Access to education was denied neither to male nor female while all children were taught to support and nurture one another and not necessarily compete against one another in the learning process. Learning was undergirded philosophically by a reverence for nature and a sense of humans’ responsibility to nature (Johnson et al. , 2005). The arrival of Europeans from 1492 onwards led to the imposition of a Eurocentric educational system which was underpinned by an Anglo-conformist assimilationist approach discussed above. This approach included educating Native Americans away from their cultures as a way of rendering them â€Å"less Native American† and more European American. The Anglo-conformist assimilationist approach in the formal education of Native Americans has left many of them miseducated and quite confused about their cultural identity. The political, economic and social impact of the European aim of Europeanizing, Christianizing and â€Å"civilizing† Native Americans through formal education are discussed at length in a paper presented by the author at the National Association of Native American Studies Conference in 2004. Fortunately, today, Native American leaders are successfully making efforts to reverse the adverse effects of the imposed Eurocentric educational system by synthesizing traditional Native American educational practices with European American practices. Works Citied Feagin, J. R. and Feagin, C. B. (2003). Racial and ethnic relations. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- Hall Johnson, J. A. ; Dupuis, V. L. ; Musial, D. ; Hall, G. E. ; and Gollnick, D. M. (2005). Introduction to the foundations of American education. Boston, Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon. Mould, T. (2004). Choctaw tales. Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi. Schaefer, R. T. (2004). Racial and ethnic groups. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. Steven Tozer (2009) School and Society : Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. McGraw- Hil Publishing Company.

UN peacekeeping operations

UN peacekeeping operations â€Å"Why are the UN peacekeeping operations rarely successful? Explain using appropriate examples†. A. Introduction With the end of the Cold War, a new generation of peacekeeping operation was born. On the one hand, the deadlock situation lived before in the Security Council was overcame for a more coordinated one. On the other hand, â€Å"almost all new armed conflicts have occurred within the territories of a sovereign state† (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p.3). This new frame claimed for a more robust peacekeeping operations able to deal with intrastate conflicts. As the 1990s passed, UN experienced difficulties to reach it objectives, changing the initial optimism for a more pessimistic position. The complexity of intrastate conflicts -waged within the population, with weak governments and serious humanitarian problems- required multidimensional peacekeeping missions. During this decade, interventions into states in conflict were justified as humanitarian intervention. Peace operations carried on during this time leaved a negative trace -Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda. The rarely successful of UN peace operations drove the organization to consider a serious change on the peace operation structure. The lack of consistency and determination of the mandates could not be sustained any longer. In words of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan peace operations are meant â€Å"(†¦) to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or -when neither of those things is possible- at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading† (Kofi Annan, 1999, p.4). The results of this change of lenses are the UN mandates in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL 1999-2005) and Haiti MINUSTAH (2004-Present). However, further consequences of this shift will come with the consolidation of the Brahimi Report (2000) in future missions. The aim of the present essay is to offer a critical analysis of the effectiveness of UN peace operations launched in the post-Cold War period, supporting the arguments with examples of the most controversial peace operations of 1990s -UNOSOM and UNAMIR. To get this approach, the structure of this essay is composed by three sections. This first one introduces the main characteristic of peace operations, articulating an understanding of the modus operandis of UN and the key problems. The second section comments the main difficulties that the coordination between the political sphere (UN) and the operational sphere (battlefield) has been facing in concrete situations -Somalia and Rwanda- showing the deterministic connection of events. Finally, a brief conclusion with the main findings and future expectations. B. Burying the seed of failure. ‘Peacekeeping is a complicated concept with complicated uses. Being the result of a difficult coordination between the political sphere UN, Secretary-General, Security Council and Member States and the operational sphere type of conflict, geographical area, and parties confronted-, peacekeeping operations lacked the consistency that should had to be effective. The problems begin with the absence of a definition of peacekeeping in the Charter of United Nations. There is no specific Article of Chapter that refers precisely to what peacekeeping operation entails, the criteria to establish it, or guidelines for it deployment.[1] According to the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (1992) peace operations concern ‘the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, with the aim to terminate the conflict and recover security in the region. Peacekeeping forces are meant to protect civilians, provide aid, supervised ceasefires, military demobilization and elections in order to bring back the state in conflict into peace and stability. As a result, peace operations during the 1990s were characterized for more complex affairs and much longer duration represented by multidimensional missions. Peace operations are, according to Fridley (2002), all UN missions involving military personnel, mandated by the Security Council and operating under the UN command. Four types of peacekeeping operations can be distinguished: (i) observation missions, (ii) traditional peacekeeping missions, (iii) multidimensional missions, and (iv) enforcement missions. The first three are resolutions taking under the Chapter VI, while the last one is under the Chapter VII (Fortna, 2006, p.6-7). Growing in complexity from one to four, the last two are applied more often since the end of the Cold War to end the conflict and improve the prospects for peace (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006). However, the optimism for a wider peacekeeping with more resources defined by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for peace (1992), ended with the opposite results than those expected. I argue in this essay that UN peacekeeping operations rarely succeed due to problems of coordination and determination. Let me go into the main handicaps. Political Sphere United Nations peace operations, as mentioned above, are the result of a mandate emanated from the Security Council (SC). Composed by fifteen members, five of them permanent and with veto power China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States (P5) -, the SC is responsible to make resolution after a recommendation for peace mission made by the Secretary-General. To approve the mandate, its required a majority of nine members. Besides the coordination needed to get the minimum votes, the resolution can be block by one of the P5. The decision of one of the members to use the veto power depends on her interest and aspirations the veto problem. This is the first setback on the way to peace. For example, in January of 1997 China used its veto power to block a peace mission to Guatemala designed to verify Guatemalas signed peace accords. The reason why China took this decision was because she did not like Guatemalas close ties to Taiwan.[2] During the process to approve a Resolution, other problems can emerge. The ‘posturing problem is the drafting of an elaborated and abstract resolution that most of the time does not contain what is needed to solve the conflict -too weak, or too pretentious This was the case of Somalia; one of the objectives of UNOSOM II was the disarmament of the militias, however, the implementation of the mandate was not feasible, specially after the withdraw of USA troops. The ‘coordination problem arrives when the great powers should define the nature of the conflict and take the most effective way to solve it; this is the crux for a appropriate design of a successful operation. However, this coordination problem is the responsible of deliberately vague mandates and a mode to get consensus between the members of the SC. Once a mandate is approved by the SC as a Resolution, the deployment of the peace forces depend on the contribution from Member States, as it is specified in the Fact Sheet of United Nations Peacekeeping. However, the authorization of the deployment does not guarantee its effectiveness.[3] As I discuss next, these inconveniences at the political level affect the operational one; a delayed resolution and an inadequate strategy have terrible consequences on the final result of the peace operation Rwanda (1993), MINURCA (1998).[4] Operational Sphere Intrastate conflicts are difficult to solve. The fundamental distinction between types of civil wars -ethnic, separatism, religion- and the parties involved make each conflict different not only the operational level, but also in the political articulation of it (Byman and Seybolt, 2003). This information should be taken into consideration for the SC to articulate a mandate that responds to the situation. But, the SC responses are not as straight forward. Crisis and its answers are shaped by the decision of those that compose the SC, who are determined by their interest and the internal situation of their country as it was mentioned before with China in 1997. However, when the conflict is considered ‘a threat to peace and the SC is able to articulate a Resolution, the intervention should be legitimized. Intervention can only take place when the state is (i) engaging in a systematic human right violations, (ii) is incapable of protecting human right violations due to the breakdown of the state authority, or (iii) when the government in power is unlawfully constituted (Semb, 2000). Justified in terms of humanitarian claims under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42)[5], the intervention must have the voluntary consent of the parties to the presence and activity involved in the mission[6]. (Fridley, 2002). The mandate is to relieve humanitarian crisis, as it was the case of Somalia (UN OSOM 1993) when the state breakdown. The success of the operational sphere depends, then, on the adequacy between the mandate and the conflict situation. Coordination The two spheres must be well coordinated to terminate the conflict. Different situation can be originated from this. It could be the case that the lack of interest form the member states to intervene generates the absence of intervention or a more complicated bargaining process to involve state members on the mission . As Wilson (2003) stress, â€Å"in the post-Cold War era the absence of a UN military capacity has meant that when the SC has at least been able to use its Character VII powers at an unprecedented rate, it has been forced to rely on a decentralized approach to enforcement the action and entrust operations to those actors willing to conduct them on its behalf†. Most of the time, this calculation is made in terms of cost-benefit analysis; when the conflict provides more loses than gains, the state will be reluctant to provide troops at the beginning of Rwanda crisis in 1993, most Member States where not interested to intervene. But, this is a double-sided sword. States can also see the opportunity to defend her interest as it was the case of UK in Sierra Leone in 1999 and Franc e in Rwanda. It could also be the case that the SC approves a Resolution and Member States agree to provide the troops as it was the case of USA with Bosnia (1992) and Somalia (1992) respectively. However, when the purpose of the mission is not clear, the precision on the solving-conflict situation is inexistent and incoherent, creating a disarticulates mission. This difficulty can be solved. Resolutions already deployed are reinforced by the events on the conflict area; a new Resolution can then answer the needs of the conflict. This was the case, for example, of UNOSOM I and a later UNOSOM II. However, when the Secretariat is not supportive enough, there is not real response to the conflict situation, and then, the mission failed Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali with UNAMIR. The complexity of levels and coordination between the spheres and within them are not following any patter. Although, the interdependence between decision-making -systematic setbacks that decrease the possibilities to obtain a coherent mandate- and conflict events -the necessity of a strong mandate to operate consistently- determines the character and effectiveness of the mission. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) address the vagueness of this UN internal process, â€Å"standards of the UN provide little guidance as to the actual decisions of the Security Council regarding when and where peacekeepers will be deployed†. This links the criteria problem; UN decision between Chapter VI or Chapter VII to generate the mandate that will determine the core of the peace operation. Mandates under Chapter VI lack the strength needed UNMOP (1996-2002) -, and mandates of enforcement under Chapter VII are costly for state members UNOSOM (1992-1995).[7] The inadequacy of institutional structure to respond effectively, the intermittent communication between spheres, and the vacuity of the mandates ended with the dominant tendency to fail. By the end of 1990s, UN was aware of this setback. The result to this declined support for peacekeeping operations was the Brahimi Report (2000). Composed by fifty-seven explicit recommendations and over one hundred implicit ones, it was prepared for the Millennium Summit. It claims for a relation between the magnitude of the conflict and the resourced and supported operation deployed to solve it. It also stresses (i) the need of criteria to avoid the intervention in conflicts that cannot be solved, and well-supported plans when it is required an intervention; (ii) a better understanding of the conflict, and coherence between the mandate and the real situation. (iii) This implies more flexible administrations rules capable to show in the Resolution a â€Å"greater delegation of authority to the field†; (iv) Clear and concrete mandates; (v) and, last but not least, a rapid deployment of the peace operation to be ready to operate within week six and twelve. Since then, a slightly modified typology has been applied. Mission as UN MIL (2003-Present), MINUSTAH (2004-Present), and UNAMID (2007-Present) were designed under this focus.[8] From my point of view, this repost stresses the most controversial points that generate inappropriate mandates. However, this only recommends certain actions on the operational sphere that can help to increase the effectiveness of the peace missions. It does not mention that the problem of coordination also involves part of the structure of UN. Even though it is possible to improve the articulation between the two spheres, states members can provide or move back troops from the operation if they consider it appropriate, interest will remain in the atmosphere of the SC, and the criteria for intervention will depend on the SC decision. Hence, the Brahimi Report is a valid document to improve the immediate problems, but does not mention the roots of them. C. Harvesting failures. The problematic coordination between the political level and the operational one, and also problems within the structure of peacekeeping operations, carry with it another obstacle: time. Since the beginning of the conflict till the deployment of the peace forces, the conflict has different picks of intensity. During this time, more elements are involved in the conflict (children soldiers, natural resources) and more destruction is generated (infrastructure, deaths, famine, etc). The longer it takes to deploy the peace operation, the more complex it will be to solve the magnitude of the problem. And this was the case of most UN peace operations during the 1990s. Nonetheless, the complexity and wide range of areas that the mission should cover, made the peace operations complicated to assess. A problem arrives then, the criteria to determine how much forces and commitments should be taken to solve each conflict. It is generally argued that UN â€Å"should have been done less in Somalia, and cold have done much more in Rwanda† (Frarrel, 2007). The case of MONUC (1999-Present), UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, is a good example. The recommended force of 6,000 troops is too small to present a credible military deterrence, but is too large for a symbolic presence considering the extension of the territory; the lack of infrastructure represented and extra complication to an already difficult operation. In same line of a criteria problem, we also have the lack of consistency in the decision-making of UN -discussed in the former section. Generally, in peace operations, the objectives are not well defined. Mandates produced by the UNSC can be indecisive, written with abstract concepts that make its application inconsistent with the real conflict -too pretentious for the force deployed or too scarce for the actual need. Military commanders will applied the mandate as precisely as possible to solve the actual situation where they find, but this does not solve the problem. The unity of command is another setback. On the one hand, troops are provided by a number of Member States, with different training and equipment. The motley composition of troops needs to operate with determination, a good coordination and synchronization. However, such adequation in time and space is nearly idealistic. On the other hand, the states members that provided troops can end their cooperation to the mission if they consider that their troops are in serious threat cost-benefit analysis. This was the case of USA in Somalia during UNOSOM II, who showed to be really sensitive to casualties withdrawing its forces after the death of eighteen soldiers. Here I describe two of the most sounded UN peace missions that gather together all the difficulties mentioned before: UNOSOM, and UNAMIR.[9] The reason why I chose these two cases is the relation that connects the two: the passive reaction to the later one was a consequence of the negative results of the former. The first conflict represents the new challenges that peace operations faced at the beginning of the 1990s. The second one a passive attitude toward the conflict, consequence of the Bosnia (1992-1995) and Somalia (1992-1995) failures. Somalia (1992-1995) United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was deployed in mid-1992 when the country reached the lower situation of her civil war and a terrible famine hit her population. The civil conflict took the country into a complete anarchic situation, where the distribution of aid failed landlords manipulated it as power. By the end of the summer of 1992, 300,000 Somalis were dead. The UNSC approved the Resolution 794 to let UNITAF, a US 37,000-strong force, to resolve the situation and establish the adequate situation for a proper distribution of aid. However, by December 1992, 95% of the population was malnourished and 70% in imminent danger of death by starvation (Western, 2002, p.115). The mandate was created to demilitarized zones to get a better distribution of the aid. In mid-1993 UNOSOM II was deployed with 28,000-strong UN force to fulfil a more ambitious mandate: the disarmament of the parties and the reconstruction of the Somalia government. However, all the efforts were truncated; the ceasefire with the warlords was broken when the paramilitary group attacked a UN patrol killing twenty-four Pakistani soldiers. UNSC Resolution 837 determined the end of the conflict; but the result was the opposite when the 3rd of October of 1994 a US helicopter was shot down; eighteen US soldier were killed. The Clinton administration withdraws her troops within months and UNOSOM II kept active till 1995 without a strong leadership and too ambitious objectives to be accomplished. [10] Even though the money invested and the strong military presence in Somalia, UNOSOM II failed in its mandate: to restore a long-term order. The difficulties faced in Somalia made the Security Council members reluctant to engage in similar conflicts, the passive reaction to the genocide in Rwanda can be explained under this focus (Semb 2000). Rwanda (1993-1994) The ethnic conflict in Rwanda ended in a terrible massacre of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The precedent of such irrational situation was an instable political situation when the Hutu-moderate government introduced a multi-party democracy that ended with the exclusion of the Hutu extremists.[11] This radical faction started a terror camping, after the accidental death of the President, to exterminate the Tutsi population of the country. By April of 1993, when the genocide started, there was a UN peacekeeping force with a limited mandated deployed in Rwanda. Composed by 2,500-strong United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was designed to monitor the ceasefire between the government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front.[12] The peace operation was â€Å"understaffed, under-resourced, and unauthorized to use force to prevent crimes†.[13] The UN response the 27th of April was inadequate: to re-establish the ceasefire. The awaited Resolution 918 to expand UNAMIR to 5,500 troops to protect the population arrived the 17th of May, too late. By July the genocide was already committed. The disintegrated situation in Rwanda was denounced by the UNAMIR Force Commander, Major General Romà ©o Dollaire, in February 1993. The UN could have been able to do much more; if not to stop the genocide, at least it could have reduced the terrible consequences of it. Boutros-Ghali was unable to push an adequate resolution and the SC was blocked by USA and UK. It can be appreciate from the examples examined the difference of commitment to bring into an end the conflict. However, both situation ended in failure. Both cases have in common the weak coordination between the political and operational spheres that generated late and inconsistent mandates. Somalia demonstrates the compromise of USA to finish it, but in the end the situation was reversed and such commitment was shown not to be that strong. Rwanda is in the opposite side of the spectrum, there was no interest part as the failure of Somalia for intervention. After a decade of rarely successful operation, the ‘credibility of UN was damaged, as it was assumed by the UNSC in November 2000, Resolution 1327. D. Conclusion: awaiting for a better harvest. The main reasons why UN peacekeeping operations during 1990s rarely succeeded were problems with coordination to approve a resolution and the inconsistence of delayed responses. I argued that the intensity of the conflict aggravated through this ‘decision time determined the structure, durability, complexity, and the final balance of these peacekeeping operation. In a simple line, we can say that the objective of the UN forces were not clear by the time they went into the conflict area. This triggered a whole succession of complications such as a deficient coordination, an irregular institutional behaviour, and the lack of criteria to establish the adequate measure of forces. Missions were then no strong enough to be able to take robust actions against peace spoilers. Overall, missions tended to fail. As I argued before, the complexity of intrastate conflicts and the corresponding peace operation can get worse rather than better if (i) the expected peace operations has not a clear objectives already designed by the time of it implementation, (ii) there is no coordination between the area of the conflict and the SC to empower the strategy to wage the conflict, and (iii) if there is no suitable ‘time-reaction from the authorities to operate on the conflictive area to stop the violence. Conflicts experience different waves of violence, and the grade of destruction increases when the peace forces are not effective. So, the longer the conflict, the more elements are involved, and the more complex the peace operation should be to re-establish peace (e.g. Children soldiers, infrastructure, mechanism of corruption, etc). In other words, the longer to make a resolution and deploy the peacekeeping troops with a specific and consistent mandate, the less effective the operation will be. The structural and functional problems considered here made clear a claim for robust mandates, that is, the implementation of the appropriate force to achieve the mission mandate, to protect civilian in danger, and provide the suitable condition to deploy the mission (Yamashita, 2008). A strong justification must support this type of robust mandates. As it was the case of Sierra Leone in 1999 (UNAMSIL); the Resolution 1313 of the 4th of August of 2000 was the result of the breakdown of the Agreement. This Resolution authorized peacekeepers to deter and counter the threat of RUF responding robustly to any imminent direct use of force (Yamashita, 2008 p. 620). This new direction of peacekeeping has also its institutional consequences. Recently published, the 2008 Principles and Guidelines Material for Peacekeeping[14] outlines the interconnection between the two spheres mentioned before. In order to get that, the SC decisions are influenced by the agreement reached and the parties that compose the conflict. The result of a good coordination will produce a suitable mandate for the conflict see also the Brahimi Repost already mentioned. To sum up, peacekeeping is not risk free, this is the main reason why if UN is going to intervene in a conflict must do it with the strength and consistency required for an effective action. Once the operation is in the conflict, it must be able to complete the mission successfully fruit of the satisfactory coordination between the political sphere and the operational one being able to bring peace where it is needed.[15] The actual deployed missions generated under this new wave of peace keeping MINUSTAH (2004-Present), UMIT (2006-Present), UNAMID (2007-Present) will show if the coordination and consistency problems, that were the pulse under which peacekeeping was shaped during the 1990s, has been solved. E. Bibliography. Annan, K. â€Å"Reflections on Intervention† in Kofi Annan, The question of Intervention, New York: United Nations, 1999. A.J. Bellamy, ‘The â€Å"Next Stage† in Peace Operations Theory? International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 17-38. J. Boulden (ed.) Dealing with conflict in Africa. (London: Palgrave-McMillan, 2003). D. Byman T. Seybolt, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars: Problems and Alternative Approaches, Security Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), pp.33-78. Donald, ‘Neutrality, Impartiality and UN Peace-keeping at the Beginning of the 21st Century, International Peace-keeping, Vol. 9., No. 4, (2002), pp. 21-38. J. Darby R. MacGintty, (eds), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes, (London, Palgrave, 2003) Doyle and Sambanis (2000) â€Å"International Peacebuilding: A theoretical And Quantitative Analysis† American Political Science Review, Vol. 94, No. 4 (Dec. 2000), pp. 779-801. David M. Edelstein, ‘Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 49-91. Also useful for following week. T. Farrell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations, in J. Baylis, J. Wirtz et al, (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An introduction to strategic studies, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 313-334. Fortna, V. (2006). Does peacekeeping work? Shaping belligerents choices after civil war. Oxford: Princeton University. Fortna, V. (2004) â€Å"Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War†. In International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun. 2004), pp. 269-292. Findlay, T. (2002) The use of force in UN Peace Operations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. M. Goulding, ‘The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, International Affairs, Vol 69, No 3, 1993, pp. 451-464. J-M. Guehenno, ‘On Challenges and achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations, International Peacekeeping, Vol 9, No. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 69-80. Guilligan and Stedman (2003) â€Å"Where do the Peacekeepers Go?† International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, Dissolving Boundaries (Dec. 2003), pp. 37-54. M. Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, no. 1, 2004, pp. 39-58. A. J. Semb, ‘The New Practice of UN-Authorized Interventions: A Slippery Slope of Forcible Interference?, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 4, (2000), pp.469-488. The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume VIII The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996. (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996). J. Western, ‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Spring 2002), pp. 112-142. G. Wilson, ‘UN Authorized Enforcement: Regional Organisations versus ‘Coalitions of the Willing, International Peace-keeping, Vol. 10, No. 2, (Summer 2003), pp. 89-106. H. Yamashita, Impartial Use of Force in United Nations Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, Vol 15, No 5 November 2008, pp. 615 630. [1] J.M. Guà ©henno (2002) [2] Francisco Villagran de Leon, Embassador of Guatemala to Canada (January 1997) for the New York Time, available at [3] The P5 has had the tendency to pas the resolutions, but has not been able to provide the means. [4] Edelstein (2004) [5] Semb (2000) [6] This can take place once a ceasefire agreement for the deployment of peace forces was reached. [7] Doyle and Sambanis, 2006. [8] For more detailed information, [9] Due to the complexity of the intra-state conflicts, I do not discuss the historical facts that composed the each of these operations. I will only concentrate in those events that where significant for the failure of the mission and that allow me to establish a critical analysis of the cases. [10] The United Nations and Somalia (1996), Boulden (2003) [11] Wilson (2003) [12] Boulden (2003). [13] Farrel, T. (2007) p. 320 [14] Available at [15] â€Å"Military intervention is a nasty business. It should never be the first option considered, but sometimes it is the only choice† (Beyman and Seybolt, 2003 p. 77). UN Peacekeeping Operations UN Peacekeeping Operations Peacekeeping was never has been mentioned in the UN Charter, but it has been a very effective means to respond to regional conflicts or civil wars. Peacekeeping, according to Mingst and Karns (2000), is the respond to deadlock of the Security Council to intervene civil wars due to the great veto powers. It helps the implementation of cease-firing agreement, prevents hostilities and it uses troops and civilian personals from the member states that voluntarily contributes their personals. It was first used, he adds, in the late 1940s to monitor the cease-fire agreeing in the land of Palestine and Kashmir. Since 1991, The UN has deployed many peacekeeping operations. It was launched in such countries as, Angola, El Salvador, Western Haiti, Cambodia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia etcà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦. Some of which were successful, yet some of which were not. Here, we will only examine on the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR). We will discover whether or not the UNAMIR was successful. Firs t, we will go briefly through the root cause of the conflict inside Rwanda. Second, we will look at UNAMIR mandate to see what task it was assigned to undertake. Later, as it is well-known that this peacekeeping operation was a failure, we will examine on why it was not able to fulfill its job. Yet, we still believe that there were some positive points of this operation too. Therefore, we will also find out what are all those points are. At last, we will come to the conclusion with the outcome of UNAMIR, and answer the objective question, Was the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda successful or not? Root Causes of the Conflict In order to understand the root causes of civil war inside Rwanda we need to look back to colonial periods. In one of her research, Heleta (2006) illustrates that Rwanda was made up of majority Hutus and Minority Tutsis. Hutus were mainly lower class people whereas Tutsis were mainly the nobles. They spoke the same language and lived side by side, yet they sometimes intermarried. Since 1890, according to Howard, Rwanda was under the colonization of Germany, and Belgium after the end of World War I. During colonial period, minority Tutsis was in favor of both colonial masters. Rwanda gained independence in 1962 after the majority Hutus raised up against Belgium, who promoted and placed many Tutsis in many positions of the administration. They also threatened the Tutsis to leave the country. Eventually, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, in 1973, created an authoritarian government after staging a coup. Bruce says, the civil war erupted when Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a mo vement which was mainly made of Tutsis, started the offensive in from Ugandan-Rwandan border. After a series of fighting between the RPF and the FAR (Forces Armà ©ss Rwandise) or the government military; and many negotiations resulted in cease firing that did not really last for long, the two warring parties agreed on Arusha Agreement of August 4, 1993. During the peace talks progress, Howard says, a new Hutu movement started to gained power and established their own militias to disrupt the peace talk and reconciliation. This is the Hutu extremist group that plans the genocide of the minority Tutsis. Heleta (2006) says, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦Hutu radicals, who saw no other solution to the Hutu-Tutsi problem but to exterminate the entire Tutsis Population in Rwanda. The Arusha agreement was signed by both warring parties, and both parties consented the UN intervention to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. UNAMIR Mandate The UN resolution of peacekeeping operation is authorized by the Security Council to determine the size and its mandate in which any decision requires at least nine out of 15 votes, and is subject to a veto by any of the five permanent members- United States, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, France, and China. Importantly, to implement the peacekeeping operation, the member states are asked to voluntarily contribute in term of troops and civilian polices, equipment, supplies, transportation, and logistical support, and also the General Assembly is responsible for approval of budget and resources of the mission. Each and every United Nation peacekeeping operation is implemented with its own purposes and objectives. A paper that unequivocally describes the purpose and objectives is called mandate. Now we will examine what UNAMIR was originally assigned to do. From the outset, UNAMIR was created to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha agreement. The mandate stated that UNAMIR would observe the cease-fire, provide security and stability in Kigali, ensure the disarmament and create the non-military zone, assist in land mine clearance activity, monitor human right and the return of refugees, and prepare for the election. As it was implemented under the Chapter VI of the UN, the use of its force was strictly limited for only self-defense (Howard, 2008). Later, after the eruption of the mass killing, UNAMIR mandate was extended to mediate the two warring parties, protect the civilian who sought refuge with UNAMIR and provide many other humanitarian aids (Bruce, 2007). UNAMIR did receive consent from both warring parties, but why was it impossible to achieve? We will answer this question in the following section. Failure and Causes Why it is a failure? The outbreak of the genocide in the face of the presence of the UN peacekeeper clearly demonstrates that the mission is a failure. According to Howard (2008), the mission was mandated to maintain peace, security and stability inside the country, but apparently it could not accomplish its tasks. The genocide killed approximately 800,000 people in just over 100 days. The UN peacekeeper was not able to respond when they were under attack from the Hutu extremists. They proved to be militarily weak, when 10 Belgium peacekeepers were killed and no respond was given from them. Instead of giving any response, the Belgium withdrew all their force; this paved the way for the genocide. What could have been worse while UNAMIR could not even prevent the outbreak of the genocide, and UNAMIR also was voted to reduce its size for the operation? In the following section, we will examine what were the obstacles, impediments and other contributing causes that contribute to its frustrating failure. What made it a failure? The failure of United Nation Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda was result many contributing causes. The major cause is the lack of political interests from member states, especially the United States, the most prominent member of the United Nation Security Council, to take any action in response to the crisis. Howard (2008) argues that the Security Council intentionally did not want to identify the problem, the genocide. None of the members inside the council would dare to challenge the new disinterest of the US. The reason of the disinterest, he adds, was the incident of October 5 1993, in which the US rangers died in Somalia. The encouragement of new peacekeeping operation also declined. Similarly, the Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali, was dysfunctional. The report of violence in April 1994 in Rwanda did not come into the hand of him in time. The Secretary-General was touring around Europe, and came back to New York only a week after the report had been submitted. Eventually, the Secretary-General did produce a report to the Security Council, a mere report. In the report, the Secretary-General did present but did not recommend any of the following suggestion: withdraw all the force, send in massive peace enforcement force, and withdraw majority of the force to save the peacekeepers life while maintaining international community presence inside the country. In the report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General missed one crucial point; identify the violence as genocide. If the report had mentioned about the genocide, the Security would have decisively taken action against it (Howard, 2008). If the Secretary had mention genocide in the report, the action would h ave been taken decisively under Article II and 1948 Genocide Convention. Found in same book, Vaccaro (1996) says The failure [UNAMIR] was twofold: not enough accurate analysis was available to the Council, and the information that was reported seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Some particular members such as US and Belgium endorsed the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the operation, complaining that they were under pressure of the mounting billion dollars operation debt; therefore, they need save up in order to pay off the debt. Besides, the United Kingdom opposed the suggestion of sending more forces into operation arguing that lessons learned from Somalia case proved that stronger force still would not be able to complete its mission, and would even worsen the situation there (Howard,2008). Eventually, the decision to downside the scale of operation was reach unanimously. The US disinterest and Secretary-Generals dysfunction created many problems. As the most prominent member of the council, no member was willing to challenge US. The US did not support the mission in Rwanda; therefore, this leads to many problems such as troop contribution, funding, etcà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦ Howard (2008) states, The council did not recommend adequate funding nor did countries provide adequate troops, given the extensive mandate assigned to UNAMIR. Jones (2007) argues that the political uncertainty during the birth of UNAMIR illustrates its destiny. Such uncertainty would provide limited implementation of its mandate, communication to its political master to respond to the problem effectively. Not only the Secretary-General that was dysfunctional, the UN headquarter also was. A report, known as black file by Canadian Major-General Romeo A. Dallaire, was sent to the UN headquarter. The report explained the plan for genocide that was not planned by President Habyarimana but by a group of Hutu extremist. It also stated the plan to kill Belgian peacekeepers to provoke the withdrawal of them, and kill all the Tutsis. The information of this report was given by a high-level official in the government who gave this information in the return of protection from the UN. When the report come into the UN headquarter, it was put aside and ignore. General Dallaire was only told to alert Belgian, French, and US, and not to attack the weapon warehouse that he wanted to. Three months later, everything mentioned in the report became real. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed along with Prime Minister Agathe Uwlingiyimana. Another contributing cause to the failure is the finance and logistic problems. The deployment of the UN peacekeeper to Rwanda was conducted in such a very slow manner. Jones (2007) describes the UNAMIR as financially and logistically very weak. He explains that the force was deployed in small detachment rather than concentrated force. The deployment of such small detachment did not provide much deterrence, and proved to be weak when the ten Belgium peacekeepers were killed by the extremist Rwandan. In term of financing the operation, it received its budget installment 8 months after the budget planned went to the UN Fifth Committee; the Advisory Committee on Activities and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). Its budget was endorsed only two days before the genocidal attack broke out, and ultimately received all its financial support one month after the attack had stopped. Moreover, UNAMIR never obtained critical asset such as intelligence capacity and defensive equipments (Jones, 2007). UNAMIR was only equipped with such armored personal carriers that was contributed from the UN operation in Mozambique. Many of those were not working, and this proved no sign in respond to the genocide. And when they were not equipped with advanced equipment, how could they face with the army with such sophisticated weapon? According to its mandate, UNAMIR was deployed under the Chapter VI. Therefore, the weakness of UNAMIR lays in its mandate, in which it was stated that the use of force was strictly limited to only for self-defense. Jones (2007) argues that this weakness contribute a lot to the failure. When the genocide broke out, the UN peacekeepers were not able to respond and to confront the army with such sophisticated weapons. Moreover, the collecting weapon method was not included in its mandate. Howard stressed that While the Secretary-General had recommended that the force be charged with collective weapons as a way to enhance the security, the Council did not include the provision in the mandate. After the killing of the Belgium peacekeepers, Belgium government unilaterally withdrew its own force from Rwanda to prevent further causalities of their personals. According to Jones (2007), this action is called Non-response. Belgium did not seek for further method to keep peace inside the region, but they withdrew their own force and this decreased moral of the other peacekeepers there. They did not only withdraw their force, they also persuaded the others troop contributing nations to do so as well. Obviously, they did this because they wanted to lower their embarrassment. This would make the peacekeeping force even weaker, and also made other countries reluctant to contribute their force. Even the new reinforcement of UNAMIR (later known as UNAMIR II) was approved in December 1994, with the mandate to protect civilians by granting 5,500 peacekeepers; however, there were not adequate troops and equipment to operate its mission. The reason of this is straightforward. UNAMIR II got narrow support from the Security Council with ten votes in favor and five abstentions by China, New Zealand, Brazil, Nigeria, and Pakistan. As a result of no immediate available force to operate, the reinforcement was only deployed in August 1995, by which the genocide had already reached its peak in mid-may and started become less severe (Jones, 2007). In short, UNAMIR II was a humanitarian mission rather than an effective peacekeeping operation. Positive points about UNAMIR The operation of UN in Rwanda is mostly considered as the failure because the lack of resources of UNAMIR in field and the limited political will commitment of UN member states and international community. Even though, they are recognized as the failure; UN had done several commitments to help Rwanda as well. These commitments would be counted as small success for UNs operation. First of all, In October, 1993 the Security Council, by its resolution 872 (1993), established the international force, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor its implementation and support the transitional Government. In addition, UNAMIR troops managed to protect thousands of Rwandese who took shelter at sites under UNAMIR control. Howard (2008) says, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚ ¦some UNAMIR troops had begun to protect civilian against genocidal attacks, which was the morally appropriate action to take civilian protection could have been included as part of a new mandate, but it was not. Next, UNAMIR also continued its efforts to ensure security and stability, support humanitarian assistance, clear landmines and help refugees to resettle. Then, when Rwanda conducted the meeting with the United Nations Development Program in 1996, international donors pledged over $617 million towards the reconstruction of the country, United Nations agencies have continued to provide humanitarian aid and to assist in the return of the refugees. After that, On 8 November 1994, the Security Council established the International Tribunal for Rwanda for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. And UN also support Rwandas national program for capacity building and contribute to the strengthening of local government and local development partner, as well as civil society actor. Conclusion In short, United Nations peacekeeping operation in Rwanda was a failure. Even though, it also had some positive points. Later in this section, we will access a very brief summary, personal analysis and recommendations. Summary UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was created to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Agreement after many bitter fighting between the government and Rwandan Patriotic Front. It was mandated to ensure peace and stability in the capital Kigali, to create weapon-free zone around the city, to help clearing land mines, and to assist the returning of Rwandan refugees. However, it was not a satisfied and successful story. Ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed by the radical Hutus, and the number of international force was decrease. This paved the way for genocide to break out, which killed almost 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus of Rwandan. Disinterest of the member states to deploy the mission in time and effectively, dysfunction of the Secretary-General were the two main reasons contributing to the failure. UNAMIR was also weak in term of financial, logistical, and military, while it was only allowed to use weapon in the means of self-defense. Personal Analysis and Recommendations After examining UNAMIR, we have found its weakness and we also have come out with what could be done to improve future peacekeeping operation. We will begin with our personal analysis. We have found that the most prominent cause of the UNAMIR is the US disinterest in authorizing the mission. After the US peacekeepers were killed in Somalia, the US became reluctant to deploy another mission, fearing further casualties of their soldiers. Therefore, the peacekeeping was lack of leadership. As Jones (2007) says, The political reluctance, which attended the birth of UNAMIR, shaped its destiny. Another significant factors contributing to the failure is the inadequate of the information by the Secretary-General. The report that the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council did not mention the violence as genocide, while it was genocide in every aspects of its but its name. If the Secretary-General had mentioned about the genocide, serious action could have been taken. After giving our own analysis, here we will articulate our recommendation. What should be done to improve the effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operation? First, UNAMIR should have been deployed under Chapter VII (peace enforcement) rather than under the Chapter VI. UNAMIR was in no position when the genocide broke out, because its use of weapon had been restricted to only self-defense. Therefore, we suggest that future peacekeeping operation to be deployed under Chapter VII (peace enforcement). If the mission is deployed with a broader use of weapon, the peacekeepers might use it to protect civilian to raid weapons warehouse, and for many other humanitarian purposes. Second, so far we have seen that only after the mission is authorized, then the troops are mobilized. UNAMIR II was authorized, but at that time it did not have immediate available troops, and it needed to wait for the member states to contribute their troops. This is a time wasting process. Therefore, we would sugge st that the peacekeeping troops to be mobilized in advance. In other word, we suggest that UN should have the reserved troops for emergency.

Golden Demon :: essays research papers

The Golden Demon (Response) Golden Demon (Konjiki-yasha) is the most important work of Koyo Ozaki, who was a pionner in modern Japanese literature. Since its publication in the form of a serial story in a daily newspaper, the novel has commanded high opinions, and many films and plays have been made of it. The â€Å"Golden Demon† synopsis is about a penniless drifter loses the woman he loves when her parents arrange her marriage to a rich playboy. Filled with bitterness and despair, the young man devotes his life to acquiring great wealth, which gradually turns him into a ruthless money lender. In brief, Omiya has a fiancà © whose name is Kwanichi. They love each other; however, she is loved by a capitalist, and her parents hope her to marriage Tomiyama. And Omiya also was dazzled by his wealth and married him. The story is talked Kwanichi’s grudge against her and Omiya’s regret about her marriage calmly, plus, it has been continued for six years. The poor girl, Omiya, couldn’t even die because of her regret feeling. She was still a old-fashioned girl who believed one’s fortune, and Kwanichi was simple-minded guy who become a leech because he was far beneath Mr. Tomiyama in wealth. However kwanichi was not really hero because he was deprived of his fiancà © and did not try to take her back. In Golden Demon, it lively depicts the live of people struggling and surviving powerfully despite being tossed about by the quickly changing waves of modern society. At the same time, the movie focuses on â€Å"love and money†, which we can safely say are universal themes for all human beings. The narrative is very â€Å"pre-modern† if â€Å"the modern† means the sense of self as unique, organic subjectivity. Since the narrative oscillates between that of and omniscient third person and emotional soliloquies by Kwanichi, Tomiyama, and especially Omiya, the reader can not see any trace of the boundary between the self and not-self. The narrator is, in this sense, nobody, who is floating in interstices of characters. This was not unusual at all before the modernist period, but it is interesting that object people’s voices restores the pre-modern type narrative in to the modern period. Does this mean that the social objects have no voice to be represented in modern narrative? Furthermore, in terms of its truth value in reality and self, for example, the value of realist narrative and confessional narrative, it was quite new and the first to openly mimic Zolaist naturalism.